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CULTURAL COMPACTNESS
Daniel R. Ortiz* †
The Supreme Court’s opinions in LULAC v. Perry, the Texas redistricting case, confounded expectation. While many believed that the Court
would develop the law governing partisan gerrymandering in one direction
or another, it did not. As exactly before, such claims are justiciable but there
is no law to govern them. In other words, the courthouse doors are open, but
until some plaintiff advances a novel theory persuasive to five justices, no
claims will succeed. On the other hand, few expected the Court to make any
major changes to doctrine under the Voting Rights Act and Shaw v. Reno.
But LULAC did. One change, in fact, may have far-reaching consequences.
In an unexpected turn, the Court adopted a new requirement—cultural compactness—under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This requirement
reflects a theoretical perspective that many progressive theorists of race and
gender have long advocated: anti-essentialism. That, by itself, is surprising.
In what follows, I lay out how LULAC developed this requirement and what
it may mean to voting rights law and to antidiscrimination law more generally. If it is taken seriously, the lesson may be bittersweet: be careful what
you wish for.
The Court’s development springs from its analysis of whether Texas
District 23 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In order to boost a
Republican incumbent’s chances of reelection in a district that was becoming increasingly Latino, Texas had replaced some of District 23’s Latino
voters with Anglo voters who would more likely vote Republican. The
Court found that the plaintiffs had met Section 2’s three threshold factors—
they had shown that Latinos in the area were “sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district,” that they were “politically cohesive,” and that the Anglo majority
votes “sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat” Latinopreferred candidates. This part of the analysis is unremarkable and makes no
real changes to existing Section 2 law.
The next stage of analysis is much more interesting. Texas claimed that
District 25, a newly created majority-Latino district, cured any problem with
District 23. In the first of its doctrinal innovations, however, the Court held
that “one majority-minority district [can] compensate for the absence of
another only when the racial group in each area has a § 2 right . . . .” In other
words, an opportunity district in one area would not “count” in the overall
Section 2 calculations unless minority voters within it would themselves
*
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have an independent Section 2 claim. This development may have several
effects. First, it limits where states can locate majority-minority districts to
satisfy Section 2. A state cannot decide to meet the requirements by creating
majority-minority districts just anywhere. Only certain places will do. Second, these locational restrictions may in turn affect the state’s ability to
gerrymander. Indeed, this may have been the very reason why the Court
created this rule. As many have noted, by failing to develop any tools to
regulate political gerrymandering directly, the Court has encouraged people
to attack the practice with the only tools available—racial vote dilution and
“one person, one vote” claims—even if those tools were developed for very
different tasks. Now perhaps the Court is developing racial vote dilution law
itself to take that into account. In other words, the Court’s inability to address gerrymandering directly might be leading it to develop racial vote
dilution law to pick up the slack. Only time will tell whether this is a dangerous development. I tend to think that it is.
The Court next had to determine whether minority voters in District 25
“had a § 2 right”—that is, would minority voters in the area covered by that
district hypothetically be able to bring a successful Section 2 claim to force
creation of that district or one like it if District 25 did not exist? Here the
Court makes its most interesting move. In deciding that minority voters in
District 25 could not meet the three threshold factors for Section 2, it reinterpreted the first factor—compactness—in a radically new way. Prior to
LULAC, the Court had viewed this factor as requiring geographical compactness. That is, plaintiffs had to show that a reasonably geographically
compact group of minority voters could form a majority within a district. If
a majority could be aggregated only by pulling together voters from farflung areas, there would be no Section 2 violation. In LULAC, however, the
Court focused on a different concern as well: the homogeneity of the various
minority voters aggregated together. Relying on the district court’s findings
that Latinos in two parts of District 25 were “disparate communities of interest” with “differences in socio-economic status, education, employment,
health, and other characteristics,” it found District 25 to be noncompact.
Thus, minority voters within District 25 could never argue that Section 2
required its creation and therefore it could not be used to offset District 23.
In one sense, this move represents the flip side of the Court’s Shaw line
of cases. Those cases held that plans subordinating “traditional districting
criteria,” like geographical compactness, to race violated equal protection.
They rested in part on the Court’s concern that districting plans must not
reinforce attitudes of racial distinctiveness—the idea that people are racially
heterogeneous. In LULAC, by contrast, the Court holds that Section 2 does
not allow us to assume that people within a single racial or ethnic group are
culturally homogeneous. As Justice Kennedy put it for the majority,
a State may not assume from a group of voters’ race that they think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls . . . . The purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to prevent discrimination in the exercise of the electoral franchise and to foster our
transformation to a society that is no longer fixated on race. We do a
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disservice to these important goals by failing to account for the differences
between people of the same race.

Although the Shaw cases worry about the differences between groups
while LULAC worries about the differences within groups, they share an
animating concern—what some have called “race essentialism.” They just
worry about it, so to speak, from different directions. Shaw says we should
not act as if people of different racial groups are very different from each
other—in this context, that Latinos and Anglos think and act differently.
LULAC, on the other hand, says that we should not assume that people in
the same racial group are all really the same—here, that all Latinos have the
same interests. Even if racial identity cashes out politically—that is, Latinos
of different stripes vote similarly—we must still prove that they are culturally homogeneous. This requirement of “cultural compactness” is quite
different from the requirements of geographical compactness and political
compactness (what the Court calls political cohesiveness), which the Court
had already read into Section 2.
What effect will this anti-essentialist turn have in Section 2 cases generally? If the Court were to require that plaintiffs establish geographical,
political, and cultural compactness, Section 2 claims would be much more
difficult. In addition to showing that members of the racial community are
geographically concentrated and politically cohesive—that is, tend to vote
for the same candidates—plaintiffs would have to show that they are culturally, economically, and socially cohesive as well. Indeed, the Court even
suggests that health differences among members of the group could matter.
Having to prove these more general forms of cohesiveness would make establishing a Section 2 claim very difficult. Could, in fact, even men and
women within a racial group be lumped together? To many, their differences, whether due to nature or nurture, are vast.
Luckily, the Court makes clear that is not the requirement. “We emphasize,” it states, that “it is the enormous geographical distance separating
Austin and the Mexican-border communities, coupled with the disparate
needs and interests of these populations—not either factor alone—that renders District 25 noncompact for § 2 purposes.” In other words, the Court is
not saying that plaintiffs have to show that the minority population within a
district is both geographically and culturally compact but only that the
threshold requirement is not met when plaintiffs can show neither form of
compactness. In this view, either geographical or cultural compactness alone
is sufficient to satisfy this first threshold requirement. (In fact, though, the
Court may limit the impact of cultural compactness even further. It suggests
that it applies only across geographically compact subgroups that are themselves geographically dispersed, not within the overall dispersed group.)
This way of reinterpreting compactness, if the Court is serious about it,
would open up rather than close down Section 2. It would enable geographically noncompact groups of minority voters to establish violations so long
as they can show that they are culturally homogeneous. It would work to
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relax the traditional geographical requirement that the Court had previously
suggested was central to Section 2.
Is the Court serious about this move? I am not sure. Although some of
the Justices who joined this part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, all of whom
were necessary for it to represent the opinion of the Court, may be happy to
relax geographical compactness, it seems odd to think that Justice Kennedy
himself is. After all, he championed geographic compactness in the Shaw
cases. Perhaps he is willing to relax it so long as Shaw requirements operate
in the background to prevent it from being relaxed too far. Or perhaps this
doctrinal innovation is only a sport that the Court will use primarily to throw
a wrench into gerrymanders. In this view, the new compactness requirement
may come to resemble the doctrinal innovations of Bush v. Gore. Unlike that
case, however, LULAC does not signal the limited range of the doctrine’s
application. If the new compactness doctrine is meant as a sport but taken
seriously by the lower courts, the Court’s inability to develop tools addressing gerrymandering will once again have collateral consequences on racial
vote dilution law.
The more interesting question perhaps is what kinds of impact this antiessentialist turn might have on other areas of law. If we take the Court’s
anti-essentialism seriously, much of existing equal protection doctrine might
change—perhaps for the worse. Take the intent requirement, which has long
been central to equal protection. How might taking a more nuanced, complex, and de-essentialized view of race or gender affect it? Should an upper
class African-American be able to challenge a law burdening her that was
clearly intended to burden only poor African-Americans? Should she have
to show that in the relevant jurisdiction rich and poor African-Americans
were otherwise culturally compact? If so, how should she do it? Or should
the burden be on the jurisdiction to defend on grounds of cultural noncompactness? In either case, plaintiffs would find it more difficult to assert equal
protection claims.
Or imagine an election law like the one struck down in Hunter v. Underwood. In that case, the Alabama Constitution disenfranchised those
convicted of crimes “involving moral turpitude,” a category selected because
delegates to the 1901 Alabama constitutional convention believed them to be
more frequently committed by blacks. The forbidden racial intent was clear.
At the time of the constitutional convention, however, women in Alabama
could not vote. The provision clearly was not aimed at them. Should Alabama’s disenfranchisement provision, then, have been struck down only as
applied to African-American men? Or should a woman later disenfranchised
under this provision have to show that African-American men and women in
Alabama are (or were) culturally compact in order to receive relief?
Affirmative action might become stickier still. Under existing equal protection doctrine, a governmental employer can give a member of an injured
racial group a preference in hiring without showing that the individual
member was himself injured by the employer’s past conduct. All the employer must show is a prima facie case that its past conduct injured some
members of the group. If the Court were to de-essentialize race, however,
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should the employer be able to extend hiring preferences only to those
members of the same culturally compact subgroups it can make a prima
facie showing for having injured in the past? Needless to say, requiring such
a showing would make affirmative action more difficult—all in the name of
respect for diversity of identity within the injured group. Such diversity is
real, of course, but legally recognizing it may be unfortunate to members of
the group itself.
Some have already made policy arguments like these with respect to affirmative action in education. Affirmative action in university admissions,
they argue, should extend only or primarily to lower class AfricanAmericans, not to other blacks who do not suffer from the same continuing
effects of historical discrimination. While meant to target affirmative action
more directly to those who have suffered harm in the past, such arguments
might explode in their champions’ faces. A court concerned with cultural
compactness might argue that true diversity—the only permissible legal basis for most affirmative action in education—can only be achieved by
ensuring that culturally noncompact members of the overall group are admitted. In other words, sensitivity to cultural diversity among black
Americans might argue against restricting a program’s benefits to any one
culturally compact group of blacks. In this view, a program restricted to historically subordinated subgroups might achieve insufficient diversity exactly
because they are culturally compact.
A larger danger is that increased sensitivity to diversity within racial and
gender groups might lead courts to question the salience of traditional racial
and gender categories. If the courts cannot assume that lower class and upper class women are culturally compact, they may come to question why the
law should continue to care about the overall category of women. More perniciously perhaps, having to pay more attention to differences within racial
and gender groups might make the courts more squeamish about addressing
race and gender generally. As Chief Justice Roberts stated in LULAC, “I do
not believe it is our role to make judgments about which mixes of minority
voters should count for purposes of forming a majority in an electoral district . . . . It is a sordid business, this divvying us up by race.” As this
passage suggests, courts forced to dissect racial and gender groups may begin to lose their stomach for the whole antidiscrimination enterprise.
Paradoxically, anti-essentialism may become a tool for those least sensitive
to racial and gender differences.

